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THE PEACE NOTES -THE ARMISTICETHE SURRENDER
A. C. UmBpum,

A.M., L.L.B., PROMSSOR OV

INTIRNATIONAI LAW.

The three most important recent world events, from the viewpoint of International Law, are the peace notes that passed
between Germany and the United States, the armistice that was
concluded on he iith day of November, 1918, and the complete
surrender of Germany.
i.

THE PEACE NOTES.

On October the 7th a note was received from Chancellor
Maximilian of Germany wherein the president of the United
States was requested to take a hand in the restoration of peace,
to acquaint all belligerent states of this request and to invite them
to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of negotiation. It was
also stated that the German government accepted the program
set forth by the president in his message to congress on January
8th, 1918, and in his speech of September 27th. This meant the
acceptance by Germany of the well-known fourteen propositions
the president had announced as necessary conditions precedent
to any peace negotiations. This note also requested a conclusion
of an armistice on land and sea.
On October 8th, the reply of the president was forwarded
to the German government. In this reply it was stated that,
before answering the note of the chancellor, the president felt it
necessary to assure himself of the meaning of Germany's note on
these two points:
First: Does acceptance of the terms of the message of January 8th and of the subsequent addresses of the president mean
an unconditional acceptance, and will the object of entering into
a discussion be only to agree upon the practical details of the
application of the fourteen propositions?
Second: Is the chancellor speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the empire that so far have conducted the
war, or is he also speaking for the German people?
This reply also emphasized the fact that an armistice was
out of the question as long as German armies are on the soil of
the nations. associated with the United States in this war, and
that good faith must be shown by the central powers in immedi-
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ately withdrawing their forces everywhere from invaded territory.
On October the I2th the German chancellor answered this
reply of the president, this answer containing, in substance, these
statements:
I. The German government accepts the terms of the message of January 8th and the object in entering into a discussion
will be to agree upon the practical application of these terms.
2. Germany agrees to evacuation and suggests that a
mixed commission be appointed to make the necessary arrangements therefor.
3. The government making this proposal has been formed
by conferences in agreement with the great majority of the
reichstag.
4. The chancellor speaks in accordance with the will of
this majority and in the name of the German government and of
the German people.
On the i4th day of October, i9i8, the president closed this
peace correspondence by his ultimatum, the salient points and
effects of which were the following:
FIRST: That the present German government has accepted,
unqualifiedly, the terms under which peace will be possible, as
announced by the message of the president to congress on January 8th, 1918, and amplified and accented in subsequent
addresses of the chief executive of the United States. This
means the unreserved acceptance of the well-known fourteen
propositions. By this statement, the president had foreclosed all
quibbling on the part of the German government as to what had
in fact been accepted as the basis for peace negotiations.
SECOND: That by reason of such unqualified acceptance the
president is now justified to make a frank and direct statement
of his decision with regard to the peace proposal. "Decision"
here, as in every case, means that the last word has been spoken,
no more discussion will be allowed, negotiations are at an end.
Either accept or reject. It was the ultimatum on the proposition
of peace by negotiation at that time.
THIRD: That the conditions of an evacuation of allied territory held by the German army and the freeing of the high seas
from submarine piracy cannot be left to a "mixed commission,"
on which Germany would be represented, but must be left to the
military advisors of the United States and her allies, that is, to
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Foch, Petain, Pershing, Haig and Diaz. To appoint a mixed
commission, on which representation of Germany was implied,
would mean that the common enemy of mankind could assist in
determining the terms of its own punishment, or, at least, of its
own partial atonement.
vouRTH: That any armistice to be considered at all must
be absolutely and satisfactorily safeguarded and guaranteed so
as to maintain the present military supremacy of the armies of
the United States and of her allies. In other words, Germany
must admit defeat, practically, must unconditionally surrender.
Germany must confess that the greatest military machine of the
ages has stripped its gearings.
VIFTH: That no proposition of an armistice will be entertained by the United States and her allies as long as the armed
forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhuman practices, in
which they still persisted- such as the wanton devastation of
territory of the allies on being evacuated, the sacking and
destruction of cities and villages on being abandoned, the looting
and plundering of the property of non-combatants, the carrying
away and practical enslaving of old men, women and children,
when forced from French and Belgian soil, the accented "frightfulness" of submarine piracy in sinking passenger ships without
notice and the added barbarity of firing upon and torpedoing
the life boats in which the passengers and crews of sinking ships
were clinging to the last straw for safety. The mere recital of
these atrocities seemed to compel, as the only condition for an
armistice, unconditional surrender.
six'r: That the cardinal condition of peace is the destruction of the arbitrary power which can separately, secretly and of
its single choice, disturb the peace of the world, or, if not
destroyed, be rendered innocuous. The present German dynasty
is such power and it is within the choice of the German people
to rid themselves of this power, or, at least, to make it harmless.
The Hohenzollerns must go.
S=VZNTH: That this last condition is a fundamental condition precedent to peace because the governments associated
against Germany must know beyond a peradventure with whom
they are dealing. We shall absolutely refuse to treat with a
power that proclaims that "military necessity" knows no law,
human or divine, and has consistently and persistently for more
than four years cruelly practiced what it preached.
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XIGHTH: That the president will make a separate reply to
the peace proposal of Austria-Hungary. Such reply, since made,
contained much less drastic demands than the reply to Germany.
There were very good reasons for this difference in our attitude
to this more or less deluded vassal of the German empire.
Austria in its conduct of the war has been much less cruel and
frightful than Germany. Nevertheless, for the awful company
Austria has been keeping during the last four- years, she must
make reparation.

Nothing was said about the application of Turkey for peace,
because we had never declared war against the Ottoman empire.
The fourteen propositions announced by President Wilson
in his message of January 8th, 1918, are, in substance, these:
(i) Open covenants, openly concluded, with no ensuing secret
treaties; (open and public diplomatic negotiations). (2) Freedom of the seas in peace and war, except as closed by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
(3) Trade equality among the nations consenting to the peace.
(4) Reduction of armaments. (5) Impartial adjustment of
colonial claims, the inhabitants to have a voice in such adjustments. (6) Evacuation of all Russian territory, with assurances
that her political and economic developments shall be unhampered. (7) Evacuation and restoration of Belgium. (8) Evacuation of French territory and restoration of Alsace and Lorraine.
(9) Readjustment of Italian frontier along lines of nationality.
(io) Autonomy of Austria-Hungary, (changed by the reply to
Austria's request of peace because the United States had recognized the belligerency of the Czecho-Slovaks and favors the
desire for nationality of the Jugo-Slavs). (ii) Evacuation and
restoration of Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro, with access to
the sea for Serbia, and the relations of the other Balkan states
to be determined by a friendly conference. (12) Sovereignty
for the Turkish portions of the Ottoman empire, with autonomy
for other nationalities now under Turkish rule, and the permanent freedom of the Dardanelles. (13) An independent Poland,
with access to the sea. (I4) A league of nations to enforce
specific covenants.
No one would have believed, previous to July, 1918, that
Germany would accede to these drastic propositions as a foundation for international peace. So to accede meant that she would
surrender all of the advantages she had gained, up to the time
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mentioned, by force of her, what then appeared to be, unconquerable military machine. Yet, it will be noted that in the first
note of Chancellor Maximilian it was stated that the German
government accepted these fourteen propositions.
In this connection, it is well to recall the fact that during
1916, President Wilson attempted to bring about peace between
the then belligerent nations of Europe. Under date of December
18, 19r6, he caused to be forwarded to all belligerents for consideration, and to all neutral governments for their information,
identical notes, signed by Secretary Lansing, in which he tentatively suggested peace negotiations. In these notes it was said:
"The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call
out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their
respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be
concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any
similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly
to compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken to
accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve or even
to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in any way that
might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the
method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable
to him as another, if only the great object he has in mind be
attained. * * * The president is not proposing peace, he is not
even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings
be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with
the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be for which
all mankind longs with an intense and an increasing longing.
He believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects
which he seeks will be understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new light into
the affairs of the world."
Under date of December 26, 1916, the German government
responded to this note as follows: "The Imperial Government
has accepted and considered the friendly spirit which is apparent
in the communication of the president, the noble initiative of the
president looking to the creation of bases for the foundation of
a lasting peace. The president discloses the aim which lies next
to his heart and leaves the choice of the way open. A direct
exchange of view appears to the Imperial Government as the
most suitable way of arriving at the desired result. The Imperial
Government has the honor, therefore, in the sense of its declara7
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tion of the twelfth instant, which offered the hand for peace
negotiations, to propose the speedy assembly on neutral ground
of *delegates of the warring states. It is also the view of the
Imperial Government that the great work for the prevention of
future wars can first be taken up only after the ending of the
present conflict of exhaustion. The Imperial Government is
ready, when this point has been reached, to co-operate with the
United States at this sublime task."
Practically identical notes were received from Turkey and
Austria-Hungary. In regard to the reference made in this note
to some proposition under date of December i2th, it is sufficient
to say that on that day the governments of Germany, AustriaHungary, Bulgaria and Turkey had sent, what was claimed to be,
a peace proposition to the Department of State of the United
States for the purpose of transmission to the entente powers,
and which note was so transmitted. In this joint note it was
claimed by the central powers that the struggle was forced upon
them, but yet they were ready to enter into peace negotiations.
To this alleged peace proposition the entente powers, under date
of December 29, 1916, replied and declined to consider the
proposition, chiefly for the reason that the proposition from the
central powers contained the statement that the war was forced
upon them, throwing the responsibility of the beginning of the
world war upon the allies, and also because the German note
boasted and prociaimed the victory of the central powers.
Coming back to the note of the United States under date of
December i8, 1916, in which it was proposed to take soundings
and find out whether peace then was possible. The proposition
to enter into a negotiation for peace at that time was declined
by the entente powers in a joint note under date of January io,
1917. The reason given for declining to enter into negotiations
at that time was most fully stated in a separate note by Great
Britain, under date of January 13, and this reason was that the
central powers, having ruthlessly begun the war, indulged in
such methods of brutality in waging the war, designed not
merely to crush those with whom the central powers were at
war, but to intimidate those with whom they were still at peace,
that even considerations of humanity urged to bring about peace
then must be disregarded. Among other things, it was said • "If
then the central powers succeed, it will be to methods like these
that they will owe their success. How can any reform of international relations be based on a peace thus obtained? Such a
8
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peace would represent the triumph of all the forces which make
war certain and make it brutal. It would advertise the futility
of all the methods on which civilization relies to eliminate the
occasions of international dispute and to mitigate their ferocity.
Germany and Austria made the present war inevitable by attacking the rights of one small state, and they gained their initial
triumph by violating the treaty guaranties of the territories of
another. Are small states going to find in them their future
protectors or in treaties made by them a bulwark against aggression? Terrorism by land and sea would have proved itself the
instrument of victory. Are the victors likely to abandon it on
the appeal of neutrals? If existing treaties are no more than
scraps of paper, can fresh treaties help us? If the violation of
the most fundamental canons of International Law be crowned
with success, will it not be in vain that the assembled nations
labor to improve their code? None will profit by their rules, but
powers who break them. It is those who keep them that will
suffer. Though, therefore, the people of this country share to
the full the desire of the president for peace, they do not believe
peace can be durable if it be not based on the success of the
allied cause."
In view of this attitude of the allied powers, the tentative
movement for world peace by President Wilson in i916, necessarily failed. It was on account of this failure, no doubt, that
the president in his note of October 14th, 1918, to the German
government, insisted that that government, before any proposition for an armistice would be even entertained, should absolutely and satisfactorily safeguard and guarantee the then military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of her
allies. It is for this same reason, in all probability, that in the
same note the president insisted that the arbitrary power which
had separately, secretly and of its single choice disturbed the
peace of the world, that is, the German dynasty, be destroyed
before any proposition for an armistice would be entertained.
It is well known that after these peace notes had been
exchanged representatives of the United States and of those
nations associated with her in conducting the war against the
central powers, met at Versailles to discuss and determine the
detailed terms of the armistice to be submitted to Germany for
acceptance or rejection. Meanwhile, Austria and Turkey kept
suing for peace and finally an armistice was concluded between
those countries and the countries with whom they were at war.
9
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This armistice, the terms and the results thereof, will not be
herein discussed.
2.

THE ARMISTICE.

After the peace notes, just discussed, had passed between
the United States and Germany, the world was intensely interested in the result that might follow. As it was generally
expected, the result was the signing of the armistice by the
plenipotentiaries of Germany. It was to be expected that after
a cruel war of over four years, the terms and conditions of the
armistice would be rather drastic. The civilized world would
not have been satisfied with anything less.
Broadly speaking, an armistice means a suspension of hostilities, a stopping of active warfare. A distinction is sometimes
made between an armistice and a truce in that an armistice,
especially for a long period of time, is generally concluded by the
governments of the belligerents, while a truce may be concluded
by the commanders of the hostile armies. There is, however, no
practical advantage in taking into account this theoretical difference.
Under the rules of International Law, the object being temporary, everything at the end of an armistice should be in the
same position as it was at the beginning, and during an armistice
each army must refrain from repairing or strengthening works
or making disposition of troops which would be to its advantage,
should hostilities be resumed. Thus, the besieged can not repair
a breach and the besiegers can not push troops to unoccupied
points. In other words, everything military must remain in
statu quo. While these are the general rules governing armistices, yet it is for the contending parties to settle the terms of the
suspension of hostility.
The modern conception of an armistice can be gathered from
recent practices of belligerent nations in this regard. Thus, preliminary to the Treaty of Portsmouth, in 1905, Russia and Japan
agreed to the following terms of an armistice: i. A certain
distance shall be fixed between the fronts of the armies of the
two powers in Manchuria and at other points. 2. The naval
forces of one of the belligerents shall not bombard territory
belonging to or occupied by the other. 3. Maritime captures
will not be suspended by the armistice. 4. During the continuance of the armistice re-enforcements shall not be dispatched
to the theater of the war.
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One of the conventions concluded at the second Hague
Conference made provisions for rules governing armistices, the
substance of which were, that an armistice suspends military
operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties
and that it rests with the contracting parties to settle the terms
thereof. In fact, the provisions on this point in said convention
are very few and brief and in no way changed the rules on this
point that had previously existed under International Law.
The armistice that was signed on November iith, 1918, is
the most drastic and comprehensive international document ever
executed within the history of the International Law. Its terms,
accepted by the representatives of the German government, are
conclusive proof of the complete defeat of Germany. They are
concise and sweeping, and are like the terms which Prussia
imposed upon France in 1871, but much more severe and humiliating. It can not be denied that the acceptance of these terms
was an unconditional surrender on the part of Germany. This
armistice makes it utterly impossible for Germany to avoid
acceptance of the terms of peace that will be dictated by the
United States and the powers associated with her. While Germany will be represented at the peace conference and her rights
considered and protected, she will no longer be in the position of
a dictator, which would have been the case if a peace conference
had been called in 1916 when German armies were victorious
everywhere.
It is not purposed here to give the details of the terms of
this armistice. Germany has agreed to give up 5,000 guns, 25,00o
machine guns, 2,ooo airplanes, all her submarines, sixteen ships
on the line, all war ships in the Black Sea, and other military
and naval instruments, equipment and supplies, sufficient to
render her defenseless. Certain fortresses on the Rhine, with
adjacent territory, will be occupied by the troops of*the allied
countries as a guaranty of the execution of the armistice.
This armistice repairs the great wrong of 1871, by requiring
Germany to evacuate Alsace and Lorraine as invaded territory.
It compels the evacuation of Belgium, Luxemburg and France,
and orders the retirement of Germans from Russia, Roumania
and Turkey, and requires that all German instructors, prisoners
and civilian agents be recalled from Russia. The treaties of
Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk intended by Germany to fasten her
control upon Roumania and Russia, are abrogated. Germany

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

must make reparation for damage done. All civilian populations
must be repatriated, and gold, silver, bank deposits, stocks and
other valuable property must be returned. Germany is required
to reveal mines and other destructive agencies, poison and polluted wells, which they have left behind, thus being compelled to
admit her infamous methods of warfare.
It is hard to see how, from a military or a humanitarian
standpoint, anything has been overlooked in the terms of this
armistice. While the suspension of hostilities is to continue for
but thirty days, yet, it is provided that an extension of this time
may be had by the consent of the parties. It is more than
probable that this time will be extended, because it is impossible
to have a meeting of the peace conference within the period
named. This point is of little importance now since by the
signing of this armistice Germany has rendered herself absolutely
impotent as a disturber of world peace.
3.

THE SURRENDER.

By the signing of the armistice in the early hours of November iith, 1918, Germany completely surrendered, a surrender
as complete as though all her armies had actually capitulated.
It was understood by all parties concerned that the signing of
this armistice was merely a preliminary step to the signing of
articles of peace in the near future. Hence, the question whether
peace will follow is no longer debatable. We are now most
directly concerned in the results that will follow the signing of
the armistice. These results, from the standpoint of International Law, will be briefly suggested.
In his message to congress, on the afternoon of November
iith, President Wilson made this significant statement: "With
the fall of the ancient governments, which rested like an incubus
upon the peoples of the central empires, has come political
change not merely, but revolution, a revolution which seems as
yet to assume no final and ordered form, but to run from one
fluid change to another, until thoughtful men are forced to ask
themselves with what governments and of what sort are we about
to deal in the making of the covenants of peace? With what
authority will they meet us and with what assurance that they
abide and sustain securely the international arrangements into
which we are about to enter? There is here a matter for no
small anxiety and misgiving. When peace is made, upon whose
promises and engagements, besides our own, is it to rest?"
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Previous to November mith, the German empire was composed of twenty-six states, more or less sovereign. At this
writing, fourteen of these states have declared themselves republics. Emperors, kings, and reigning dukes have abdicated as
rapidly as fear for their personal safety permitted them to do.
If the turbulent and violent elements of the central European
nations secure control, the autocracy of the mob will succeed the
autocracy of militarism. Between the two there is little choice.
If there is any, it is in favor of militarism, because that at least
produced quiet and order, although it may have been the quiet
and order of a political cemetery.
It will be remembered that this country has repeatedly and
solemnly declared that the reason for our entering the world war
was to make democracy safe in the world. This international
promise we must keep, and we will keep. But in making this
promise we assumed large responsibilities, because if the peoples
of the central European nations show by their conduct that they
have confused license with liberty and have chosen anarchy in
place of autocracy, it becomes our solemn duty to assume control of their affairs and teach them the ways of peaceful and
orderly self-government. This does not mean that we shall
assume the attitude of a policeman, or even of a traffic cop, but
does mean that we will have to take the attitude of a big brother
who seeks to lead these misguided peoples into the orderly ways
of democracy, but, if mere leading is not sufficient, we will not
hesitate to employ the strong arm of correction, where necessary.
There is another great danger, internationally, in the situation as it has already been developed and is developing in Europe.
Attention has already been called to the fact that there are
twenty-six little nations in what was formerly the German empire.
Russia has already been divided into Finland, Ukrainia, Courland, Lithuania, Esthonia, Levonia and the Caucases. In addition to these, we have Poland, Czecho-Slavia or the northern
Slavs, Jugo-Slavia, or the southern Slavs, Dardanellia, Armenia,
Palestine, Arabia, and Persia restored. If small nations, crowded
together in limited territory with difficult frontiers, work for
international trouble, the situation just referred to is full of
dynamite. In addition to all this, the small nationalities just
referred to are further rendered full of high explosives because
of minority nationalities found in each of them. Czecho-Slavia
has its German minority, Poland its Russians and Jews, JugoSlavia its Italians, Dardanellia its Turks, Armenia its Turks. All
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these little nations will have their representatives at the peace
table and their rights must be determined at the peace conference,
not only determined, but steps taken to protect them. All of
them apparently have adopted democracy as the panacea for all
their ills. The countries associated with the United States in
this world war, Great Britain, France and Italy, are exhausted by
the four years' contest and will have all that they can do to
rehabilitate themselves. The United States is the only large
nation that has come nowhere near exhaustion, with its great
resources practically unimpaired and its manpower, not only
virile, but practically in full force. Hence, the task of teaching
all these nations, large and small, the ways of democracy, rests
upon us alone, and if we should fail, then democracy again will
become a dream. While the war against autocratic militarism is
over, the contest to make democracy safe and workable has but
just begun.

THE LAWYER AND THE WAR*
The nineteen months which have passed since America drew
her sword and joined the hosts of freedom have been months
of intense effort and of no small achievement, prophetic of a
greater future. A great urge has come upon us, marking the
swelling tide of America's purpose. The farmer has bent with
renewed energy above his furrow; the miner has redoubled the
blows of his pick; the shipwright has made the air tremble with
the sound of his hammer, and the inventor has given us machine
guns for our army, depth bombs and detectors for our navy,
tractors for our artillery and engines for our airplanes. Even
the artist and the painter have put their peaceful talents to warlike use and have created a new art of disguise for men on land
and ships at sea. Whether it has been of men or money, of
labor or loyalty, of service or sacrifice, no draft has been made
that has not been fully honored. "The heart of the citizen is a
perennial spring of energy to the state," and the hearts of Americans are in this war.
I need not argue that in this turmoil of action and achievement the lawyer has fully played his part. To him, as to others,
has come the call to arms, and he has gone freely and willingly,
* Revision of an address delivered by Solicitor General John W. Davis,
before the Kentucky Bar Association, July 2, 1918.
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